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It's particularly important to realize that employees have a limited capacity for following security policies. In most cases, security is secondary to productivity, and employees who've exhausted their "compliance budget" will seek to create workarounds for policies perceived as overly demanding. 1 It's hard to predict how employees will respond to a policy, and many organizations implement policies without even considering this.
Because of these factors, as well as the problem of accurately predicting the nal outcome, security policy selection is lled with uncertainty and o en done based on experience, best practice, or what everyone else is doing. Such approaches don't re ect an organization's particular circumstances or characteristics, and the policy's performance is likely to su er as a result, meaning that the organization's security requirements won't be met.
In this article, we explain our solution to the problem of predicting the e ectiveness of an organization's security policies and their impact on its operations. Building on a range of ideas from the economics of information security [2] [3] [4] and mathematical systems modeling, 5 we created a methodology and framework for building models that can be used to predict the consequences of di erent policy choices.
Modeling
A model that represents the system of interest can be used to help security managers think about and explore details of the system's operation. A model lets them ask questions about di erent policy choices, such as "How memory or money, we expect to be able to combine them to form a greater stock as well as compare them to determine which stock is larger. The appropriate abstract mathematical structure for this purpose is called an ordered monoid. 5 The mathematical setup for modeling processes uses a theory called process algebra, in which complex processes are constructed from basic actions using combinators-similar to logical connectives-for sequencing, choice, concurrent or parallel execution, recursion, and so on. 9 In our setup, locations, resources, and processes coevolve:
indicates that a process E with access to resources R at location L can evolve by performing action α to become the process E¢ with access to resources R¢ at location L¢. This relationship between the states L, R, and E of the model is defined logically by formal operational semantics. 5 The systems we model don't exist in isolation. Rather, they operate in an environment with which they typically interact. Events in the environment-which isn't modeled in detail-might have effects within the model and vice versa. Mathematically, we handle this situation stochastically. That is, we use probability distributions to describe the flow of events between a model and its environment. For example, when we model the arrival of employees at a building (from the outside world, which is the environment) we use a negative exponential distribution, which describes the time between events occurring. 7 This mathematical setup can be captured in programmable tools. The Gnosis tool captures it very closely, but is essentially a proof-of-concept implementation. 5 We used the Julia language (http://julialang .org) to implement the mathematical framework in a way that supports a natural programming style.
A model is a simplification of the real-world system, with levels of abstraction and detail appropriate to the modeler's questions. A model is almost always an incomplete description of the real-world system: "the map is not the territory. "
The process of building a model and collecting the data to parameterize it is a cycle. An initial model is constructed based on observations of the real-world system. The model's consequences are then interpreted as real-world consequences, which are compared to the real-world observations. If they're close enough, the model can be considered complete; if not, the model is adjusted or rebuilt and the cycle continues until the model is good enough for its purpose.
What a model can accurately represent depends on the data available and the ease of collecting it. If a model
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requires data that's unavailable, the modeler must adjust the model to remove the need for that data.
Models of Organizational Security Policies
Our three example models use different aspects of an organization's security. The first model looks at tailgating behavior of employees and attackers-types of agents-at the entrance of an office building. Agents are autonomous decision makers who interact with other agents and resources in a model. The second model determines how confidential documents are shared between employees inside the office when the normal, secure method is unavailable. The final model looks at how often employees' devices-possibly containing confidential information-are lost. The models are represented in Figure 1 , which depicts the physical and virtual locations used in each model as well as the agents' processes.
We designed these three models so that they could later be composed, allowing the modeler to examine the interactions between parts of the organization's security policy (see Figure 1) . How the models fit together is determined by interfaces, which specify the locations that the models share, such as the outside and atrium locations in Figure 1 .
When composed, these models provide an analysis of how the confidential information that an organization processes can be lost. Shared confidential documents that end up on a mobile device in the document-sharing model might be exposed if that mobile device is then lost in the device-loss model. Similarly, shared confidential documents that end up on portable media in the document-sharing model might be exposed if attackers gain access to those media, having penetrated the access control in the tailgating model. Although each model captures particular aspects of organizational security, the composed model explains how physical and cybersecurity breaches can lead to the exposure of an organization's confidential information.
When a model with interfaces is uncomposed, some processes that start at interface locations are initiated by the environment. For example, in Figure 1 , when the tailgating model isn't composed with the deviceloss model, the employee processes are started by the environment in the outside location. When the model is composed, the employee processes are started by the environment in the home location of the device-loss model. The environment no longer starts the employee processes at the outside location. Instead, the process is executed in this location as a consequence of the device-loss model.
We previously explained the mathematical theory of interfaces and their use in composing models in "Modeling and Simulating Systems Security Policy. " 8 
Tailgating
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atrium (see Figure 1b ). In this model, agents start in the outside location and progress to the lobby, where they must use a swipe card to access the office. If they forget their card, they must decide whether to tailgate behind another employee or queue at reception to get a temporary badge. Only employees make this decision; attackers always attempt to tailgate. Agents who choose to queue at reception move to the reception. Those who tailgate move to the entryway, as do those who remembered their cards. If employees in the entryway observe a tailgater, they have another choice: intervene and stop the tailgating agent, or ignore the tailgater and continue. If tailgating agents aren't challenged, they proceed to the atrium.
Document Sharing
The second model examines information-sharing choices in the office. Employees need to share documents with one another and normally do so using a server that restricts access to only those with the correct permission. The document-sharing model examines what happens when employees must share documents using a different method.
This model has only two locations: atrium and office (see Figure 1c) . Agents arrive in the office from the atrium. Employees begin to work, and if a problem occurs when sharing a document the normal way, they have three choices. First, they can put the document onto a global shared drive accessible by all employees. Second, they can email the document to the recipient. Finally, they can give the document to the recipient on some form of portable media, like a CD or USB key. In each case, a resource representing a document is moved to a location representing the place where it's digitally stored-that is, a virtual location. Attackers in this model enter the office and immediately begin to look for any media lying around. The attacker's success depends on the number of disks and desks in the office.
Device Loss
The final model is quite simple and deals with device loss outside the office. Employees might have confidential information on their devices that, if the devices are lost, might be exposed. This model has four physical locations: home, car, public transport, and outside ( Figure 1a) . Each employee starts at home and travels to work using public or private transportation. After the workday is over, employees return home using the same method. Those who take public transportation risk losing or leaving behind their phones or other mobile devices during the commute.
Here, mobile devices are modeled as a bundle of a resource, which represents the device, and a location, which represents the device's data store. In the composed model, confidential documents sent by email are moved to the devices' data stores (that is, downloaded by an email client).
Agents and Decision Making
The distributed-systems modeling approach doesn't have a native concept of an agent. 5 Instead, we create the notion of an agent using a bundle of a process, resources, and locations. An agent has resources that are available for it to use and a location in the model. It also has a process that describes how it behaves-for example, how it moves around the location graph, how it moves resources around the location graph, and how it interacts with other agents.
An important part of the models is the way agentsfor example, employees-interact with the security policies and technologies in place. Employees must make decisions about, among other things, whether to comply with security policies. The framework handles this through a choice function, which captures points in a process at which decisions are made. Each choice point is a decision among several alternatives. The specific method used by an agent to choose among these alternatives isn't set explicitly in the framework; rather, the modeler chooses methods suitable for the particular models being created.
In our models, each agent has preferences for security and productivity and makes decisions based on these preferences and the current state of the model (see Figure 2) . The agent's preferences are drawn at the beginning of model execution from distributions that describe the preferences of the entire agent population. This means that each execution will involve agents with different preference values, possibly resulting in different outcomes.
To decide among different choices, an agent first calculates a value for each choice C: 
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where p sec is the agent's preference regarding security, p prod is the agent's preference regarding productivity, and f sec (C) and f prod (C) are functions that calculate how secure and productive, respectively, the choice C is, given the current state of the model. The agent selects the choice with the highest value.
System Manager's Utility
So far, we've discussed how models are built and how agents in them make decisions. Now, we consider how system managers can understand the values of policies described by models. To be a useful tool for thinking about different policy choices, a model must be capable of indicating whether one particular choice is better than another. This is done by expressing the output of a model as a utility, 10 which gives a value for the system's performance relative to the system manager's objectives. The policy choice that best satisfies these objectives is the one with the greatest utility.
Security managers care about different system attributes. 10 These attributes could be broad concepts, such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability, or more specific, such as the number of successful tailgating attempts or the time employees spend interacting with security. For each attribute, a security manager has a target value; the target value for availability would presumably be high, whereas the target value of successful tailgating attempts might be zero. The manager cares about each of these attributes to a different degreesome are more important than others-and also cares differently about how the values for each attribute deviate from their target. For example, a small increase in the time an employee spends interacting with security might not matter very much until the deviation crosses a threshold, whereas any decrease in availability matters a great deal.
The utility can then be described by the equation
where, for attribute a from set of attributes A, w a is the relative weighting, or importance, of that attribute; v a is the attribute's actual value; ῡ a is the target value; and f a is the function representing how much the system manager cares about this attribute's deviations from the target value. If the attribute values are stochastic, then this represents the expected utility.
The system manager must supply the target values, weights, and deviation functions. Each attribute's actual values can be collected from the real world to evaluate the current system policy, or from models to evaluate possible policy changes.
In models, the attributes' actual values depend on the decisions agents make. Each decision has several alternatives, and each alternative has a value to the system manager. A particular decision, D, with choices C 1 , C 2 , … , C n made by an agent during the execution of a model can be written as
, where the choice that was selected has l =1 and the rest have l = 0. This equation is in the form of a CobbDouglas production function. 11 As an agent explores a model, making decisions D, the values v a of one or more of the system manager's chosen attributes a are affected, thus affecting the overall utility for the manager. For example, if one of the manager's attributes is the number of tailgating incidents, then each time an agent decides whether to tailgate or not-either not complying or complying with the policy-the utility is affected.
This form is useful only for decisions made after the execution of a model. To think about decisions before the model has been executed, we must consider the expected value of the decisions. An agent's choice at a decision point can be stochastic-either because the choice function itself is stochastic or because the decision is based on the current state of the model, which is based on distributions. A standard transformation of the previous function allows it to be used for expected values: 12
where l 1 , …, l n are now probabilities and sum to 1.
The decisions' expected values are useful because they tell us the values for all the possible paths the model's execution could take, rather than just the path taken during a single execution. However, calculating the probabilities for different choices, although possible Figure 3 . The distributions of agents' preferences in the document-sharing model. The horizontal axis is the preference for the given attributes (here, productivity and security); the vertical axis is the probability density function (pdf). Most agents will prefer productivity over security. Productivity Security in theory, is extremely difficult. So instead, we can execute the model many times to approximate the expected values and use these to calculate the expected utility of the policy as a whole. The system manager uses this expected utility to judge a policy's value.
Example: Policy Choices
To show how models can be useful tools for thinking about security policy, we use the following documentsharing example. The normal, secure method for sharing documents with other employees often breaks or doesn't allow a document to be shared with the necessary people. The organization's security manager is concerned about how many documents end up on a globally accessible shared folder, allowing all employees to view it, and wants to recommend sharing the documents via either email or portable media as an alternative. The employees' decisions in the model depend on their preferences for productivity and security. For each execution of the model, the employees' preferences are drawn from probability distributions-shown in Figure 3 -that would be selected to match the actual attitudes of the organization's employees. In this example, the distributions show a fairly typical situation in which employees are much more likely to favor productivity over security.
The security manager then runs the model for the current policy choice, giving no suggestion to employees, and for the two alternatives, suggesting to employees that sending documents via email or media is the preferred, more secure method. The results of these simulation runs are presented in Table 1 , which shows, for each policy alternative, the average number of documents (from 10,000 simulation runs, with 400 agents) that were distributed by email, by media, and by the globally accessible share as well as found by attackers on media inside the office.
When no guidance-the neutral policy-is used, all employees choose to use the globally accessible share. When employees are told that the media policy is preferable, several choose to use that method, but more still use the global share. When employees are told that the email policy is preferable, the majority of them do so, but some still use the global share. In this model, the global share is the fastest and therefore most productive choice; email isn't as productive as the global share but is still faster than using portable media. This explains why some employees use the global share even when instructed that an alternative method is more secure: they have a much higher preference for productivity than security.
We can determine which policy is the best choice by looking at the security manager's expected utility 8, 12 :
Each attribute's expected value depends on the stochastic process Φ a , which is derived from the sequences of decisions D. In theory, this can be calculated using queuing theory and knowledge about the model's and environment's stochastic elements; however, in practice, this is extremely difficult. Instead, we can approximate this value by repeatedly executing the model. As the number of executions increases, the accuracy of this approximation increases. For this example, let's assume that the security manager cares about only two attributes in this model: the number of documents put into the global share and the number of documents found by attackers inside the office. The manager would like to reduce the number of documents in the global share to approximately half its current value and sets a target of ῡ global = 70; the target value for the number of documents found by an attacker is ῡ found = 0. The manager is concerned about not meeting the target for the global share by a lot, but doesn't care as much about exceeding this target; to represent this, we use a linex function f global (x) = -(e 0.01x + 0.01x -1). 13 The manager cares linearly when exceeding value but exponentially when not meeting the target. Because the target for attackers finding documents is zero, we can use f found (x) = -e x + 1 for the other function. The manager is more concerned about attackers finding documents than employees putting documents on the global share, so we use the weights w global = 0.5, w found = 1.0 for the two attributes' relative importance. 
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Now that we've specified these values and functions, we can calculate the security manager's expected utility for each policy choice (see Figure 4) . The highest expected utility comes when employees are encouraged to use email to share documents. Transferring documents by portable media has higher expected utility than the neutral policy but lags behind email because of the larger number of employees who still use the global share, and because of the number of documents that attackers find.
Next, let's consider this model when it's composed with the other two. The attackers are always present in the model as it is, and the security manager thinks that access control at the building entrance could affect how many documents they discover. In addition, the security manager is concerned about employees losing devices containing documents they've downloaded from emails and wants to know whether email is really the best choice.
In this example, we add only one attribute to the utility calculations: the number of documents lost on devices outside the office. There's also one more policy choice: whether a guard is present to watch for tailgaters at the building's entrance. The results from the simulations are shown in Table 2 . The presence of the guard changes the number of documents attackers find inside the office under the media policy but has little effect on the other two policies.
For the new attribute's utility calculations, the manager uses a target ῡ lost = 0, the same function f lost (x) = -e x + 1 as the one for documents found inside the office, but with a greater weighting w lost = 1.5 because the manager feels this is more severe. The values and functions for the other attributes from the document-sharing model remain the same. This new attribute is simply added to the utility calculations for each policy choice. Figure 5 shows the new expected utilities. Once again, the email policy achieves the highest expected utility, followed by the media policy. The guard's presence increases the media policy's expected utility value but not enough to catch up to email. In this example, the security manager might feel confident suggesting that employees email documents to one other when the normal system isn't working. However, in reality, the security manager would be concerned with a greater number of attributes and would likely have very different weightings for them. For instance, in the tailgating model, the security manager might also be concerned with attributes such as the actual number of tailgating attempts by employees and attackers, how many of them are successful, how much time employees spend getting through security, and how much time they spend getting replacement badges from reception. The manager would also likely have greater concerns about documents sent by email: How safe are accounts from outside attack? Could documents be exposed that way? These questions could be addressed by simply adding an attribute with a large weighting for the number of documents sent over email, representing the risk of this method, or in greater depth by composing these models with another that models the email system and its vulnerability to cyberattack.
T he models used in this methodology capture the aspects of the real-world system needed to evaluate security policy, including the physical and virtual locations in the system, its logical and technological components, and the behavior of the agents interacting with the system. In this methodology, models of complex systems are constructed as compositions of smaller models of specific parts of the systems. The underlying mathematical foundation of the methodology ensures the soundness of both the models' composition and their representation of the systems of interest.
These models illustrate that our methodology applies equally well to cybersecurity and physical security, which can be intimately interconnected. Many extensions are possible. For example, we could compose the document-sharing model with a model of the organization's Internet connection, letting us explore the exposure of its confidential information via attacks on its mail and webservers.
Building a model helps us understand the relationships between a system's physical, logical, behavioral, and policy components. Collecting the data required to parameterize the model can give insight into the system's current performance and the behavior of agents in it. Once these steps are complete, the model allows reasoning about and experimenting with alternatives, giving predictions about how the system will perform 
